By Lucy Law Webster

The international interventions of the past decade in Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq have positioned peace, law and human rights in strange forms of tension with each other. Even though international humanitarian law and peace are actually congruent, the only forms of international intervention that would be legitimate have not as yet been tried.

Collective security, as envisioned by the UN Charter, was intended to allow strong states to protect weak states from foreign aggression. But there have been relatively few acts of invasion across neighboring borders; the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that was reversed by the Persian Gulf War was an exception. Most wars occur within states as civil wars between factions or insurgents against incumbents. Almost any international intervention, whether fully endorsed or just barely tolerated by the UN Security Council, leads to power gains and losses within the country in conflict as well as internationally. It also typically results in some measure of outside control and imperialism even when the motive is humanitarian. It is sometimes said that collective security is what the P5 permanent members of the Security Council do to poor nations. And now we have seen the physical invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq led by the world's only superpower. The fact that the first of these wars is deemed legal (the United States was attacked by people based in Afghanistan) and the second is viewed as much less legal obscures the main issues. Both can be seen as callous acts of empire by the people attacked, and the current patterns of interstate behavior that these wars represent have in fact been challenged by new and better norms now being established for international action. Collective security requires collective punishment; whole nations suffer because of actions taken by their leaders. And the use of military force by Security Council mandate requires the violent imposition of order as defined by and administered by global powers whether they are sensitive to the local and regional culture or not. Such military globalism feels like imperialism to the people whose lives and homes and cultures are attacked and it looks like imperialism to millions of people worldwide who value human rights and cultural autonomy. Whoever endeavors to impose democracy probably does not understand it. First, democracy requires voluntary participation, which is unlikely to emerge in situations where soldiers of major military powers impose order according to norms that reflect those of industrialized states acting against less industrialized, less “modern” or less Westernized nations and peoples.

Nevertheless, when militias supporting Serbia or Indonesia attack the people of Kosovo or East Timor, I would assert that the international community has a responsibility to protect the people attacked and that the UN has a duty to act. Whenever the government of any state abrogates its sovereign responsibility to protect the people within its borders, it is the duty of the international community to protect anyone who is the target of systematic human rights abuses like genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. The purpose of this essay is to indicate how protection can be provided without war—without action that contradicts the essential objectives of the action taken.

The “best-practices” criteria for international humanitarian intervention can be specified as follows:

1) There must be a just cause relating to a supreme humanitarian need.

2) Force should be used very carefully for specific testable objectives, but it should be available early, to be used proactively to stop violence as soon as it appears.

3) The means used should be consistent with the ends sought and it should meet the test of proportionality.

4) The decision to intervene should have a high probability of achieving a positive humanitarian outcome.

In Kosovo, and also in East Timor there was a clear humanitarian need for international action. In both cases humanitarian intervention could have prevented extensive crimes against people and property had the international community acted sooner. The impending violence that attracted international attention in Kosovo in 1998 had been anticipated for several years. The Belgrade government had been removing ethnic Albanian Kosovars from public employment, and much of the displaced leadership established a peaceful, informal, parallel civil administration, while others became new recruits into the Kosovo Liberation Army.

Similarly, in East Timor, intimidation of pro-independence citizens provided clear signals that there would be retribution if the vote passed. This was clearly presented as a serious possibility to the UN Security Council prior to the August 1999 ballot asking people to choose between autonomous incorporation into Indonesia or independence. Nonetheless between the announcement of the ballot results on September 4th, and the time the Council voted to set up a multinational force under Chapter VII of the Charter (Resolution 1264, September 15, 1999), almost two-thirds of the population had fled their homes and villages to escape the murder and pillage of militia units opposed to independence.

In Kosovo, the action taken by the international community was not only too late to have any preventive value, but it was also disproportionate and disjunctive in relation to the problems faced by the people persecuted by Serb militia and Yugoslav army personnel. Moreover, the action taken by NATO was inconsistent with its stated humanitarian goals. The bombing made it easier for Milosevic to dislodge people from their homes, not harder. The probability of achieving a positive outcome in Kosovo when the intervention took place must be assessed in relation to the goals set, whether explicit or hidden. The humanitarian goals claimed were not effectively met because of the extensive displacement and destruction of lives and property, along with the ambiguous stability for Kosovo of the resulting peace. If the goal, however, was regime change and bringing Milosevic to court, those objectives were achieved.

In the case of East Timor, the intervention force approved by the Security Council on September 15, 1999 succeeded in mitigating a humanitarian disaster. The fact that it arrived too late to save the lives and homes of many is a result of the fact that the Security Council did not find a way to act except by a coalition of the willing, led by Australia, which would not act without the agreement of Indonesia. Australia was the only major state to have recognized Indonesian sovereignty in East Timor following the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor in 1975. But there was nothing to do except wait for Australia to wait for Indonesia. This demonstrates a lack of international peacekeeping capacity, and strongly suggests that the United Nations should have its own standing force, ready to move in to protect people without waiting for major states to do so. The best model would be a directly recruited force responsible to the UN Secretary General without the encumbrance of real or perceived imperial attitudes or ambitions.

A legitimate system of global responsibility would need to actively encourage participation from local and regional communities. The past half century of professionalization and international institutionalization of development planning has created a culture in which outsiders arrive in problem areas to suggest and guide and sometimes to impose solutions. Should the historic experience and knowledge of the local people and the cultural region not be given similar respect? The past 200 years of economic growth has served some nations well, but it now seems clear that many nations might have developed in a manner that would have better served the people had the paths chosen been more firmly grounded in their own history. Now, there are disturbing disjunctions. Should the salary of an engineer recruited as a driver for a “development expert” be higher than the salary of a construction engineer? How can community development become development of the people, for the people and by the people? How can democracy grow from existing historic roots? These are urgent questions to address if participatory development is to engender local power for democracy. More local and regional leadership is needed to nurture power from the cultural roots of nations and peoples.

The sources of terrorism lie in the alienation that arises in people who are most disenfranchised – those at the bottom of an undemocratic world system where military imperial power is imposed on nations that are themselves deeply undemocratic. Terrorists are recruited in countries that lack modern education and constructive opportunities where there is a backdrop of extreme poverty and a sense of anger at threats to the nation, the religion and the culture. Many turn to terrorism when it feels more empowering to participate in commitments to destroy than to participate in building.

A major commitment is needed throughout United Nations agencies, by individual governments, and by networks of NGOs to redeploy “development assistance” away from the experts and to give it to the people. All children deserve access to modern education and experience of their own historic culture and of world community values as well as access to food, clean water, shelter and basic health services. If these services are not available, the security of the entire world is put at risk. Locally generated community development can provide the key to bringing basic cultural and economic services to villages and cities throughout the world. People must be engaged in their own development and in their own security.

There is an unused tool available for locally-based community development in the largely hortatory commitments made by almost all governments throughout the world to various norms of international law and programs of action generated by a range of UN bodies and conferences. In the hands of the people this body of commitments can become a powerful tool—either for direct action or for putting pressure on ones own government to fulfill its stated obligations. If local civil society groups were proactively involved doing what is needed to enhance implementation, they would not only achieve some of the objectives identified such as better access to clean water and sanitation, but they would build their own power to achieve and to protect themselves from any future economic exploitation or violation of their human rights. Such self-generated action can be coordinated with the work of international networks of NGO's that could provide resources when invited and help connect with broad networks of governments and with the UN Security Council. One goal is to put the Security Council on call to serve people, especially people in communities at risk of violence and exploitation.

Another goal is to forge local and worldwide networks in support of UN norms as a counterweight to the power of the sorts of militias that played truly devastating roles in Kosovo and in East Timor. In most countries at risk of violence and human rights abuses, as well as those at risk of extreme poverty, there are many civic groups that can better mobilize themselves to act if they see an overarching strategy for self-enhancement. The goal is to empower local communities that are embedded in their own cultures to use the global norms that fit their needs.

In parallel with local action, international NGOs that respect cultural autonomy can, when asked, assist in monitoring human rights interests by keeping records of violations and making these available to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights or to officials of the International Criminal Court. The role and the responsibility of individuals before international law is expanding. A major step forward is represented by the International Criminal Court, making individuals as well as states responsible under international law. This is the best way to end the collective punishment inherent in war and in traditional forms of interstate action for collective security. The citizens of every nation can be directly protected by international law. If it is known that people are watching, potential wrong doers will be deterred. Local and global networks of civil society groups and of governments can monitor the implementation of agreed norms of humanitarian law. They can use preventive diplomacy to avert violence. It is easier to visualize how this could have worked in Kosovo or East Timor than in Afghanistan under the Taliban or Iraq under Hussein, but that is largely a matter of timing and sequencing. By engaging in the implementation of the less controversial parts of the many plans of action and other agreements that states have endorsed, thousands of aware citizens can be ready to prevent the importation of illicit arms, the exploitation of labor or the violation of human rights.

The price of freedom is early vigilance. That is the point of the strategy of proactive, locally-based engagement suggested here. The big news is that now, unlike the 1930s, there is a network of civil society groups committed to protect the human rights of people everywhere, and to respond to cries for help. There is also a network of middle-power states that is equally committed to protect the citizens of every nation from genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity even when such crimes are committed by a citizen's own government. These are the groups and the nations that understand that collective security by means of war is essentially dysfunctional and counterproductive, but that there are now institutions and norms that make it possible to replace the rule of war with the force of law. As more and more states sign onto a law-based mode of international action, the role of imperial, war-based power will shrink. If the nations using the soft power of law are supported by civil society, that mode of action will prevail. Above all, if civil society within the countries and communities at risk of exploitation and violence uses its own ability to communicate and grow, it will be able to act in concert with the states and citizen networks that actively seek direction from the people who most need their support. Such direction from below will undermine the power of empire. Empires depend upon authoritarian decisions imposed from above with military force. The value of such force can be replaced with effective law-based action implemented by the people and by the United Nations.

It is important to assess how different forms of international action can contribute to the expectations of individuals, and the norms that affect state practice. What is done successfully in one case will become a model for the future. Rightly or wrongly, states will feel constrained to act within the precedents set. Thus each case becomes a precedent and a model for future action. The most benign form of intervention in defense of human rights would be to send in UN Marshals to apprehend individuals who commit crimes against humanity, war crimes or genocide. This could be done with almost no violence if there were strong convictions within the nation concerned that these crimes should be stopped and prevented in the future. Civil society support of UN action would be of critical value to underpin successful interventions by UN Marshals, so that a pattern of such interventions would deter future violations.

We have seen that individuals and networks of non-state actors can be very powerful. A combination of high technology, lethal weapons and borderless communications means that a wide range of people and groups can act decisively to do harm. It will not always be practical to bomb the country that harbors terrorists, and such action generates new terrorists. Modes of international action must be developed that engender relatively peaceful responses by states and by individuals. The efficacy and legitimacy of any given action should be assessed in terms of its long-term impact, not just in terms of what it achieves initially. A democratic response to any challenge to peace and human rights is required by the people from within nations and cultural regions to uphold their own civic values, their own cultural norms and the peaceful global norms that have been endorsed by the United Nations and by governments worldwide.